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CHERTOFF, Circuit Judge.
Christine Lennon appeals a final
judgment of conviction and sentence
entered by the District Court. Lennon
pled guilty to being “found in the United
States, having knowingly and unlawfully
re-entered the United States” in violation
of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2).
Lennon claims that the District Court’s
sentencing analysis violated her rights
under the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto

Before: ROTH, AMBRO and
CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June16, 2004 )

PATRICK L. MEEHAN, Esq.
United States Attorney
LAURIE MAGID, Esq.
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clause. In part, this analysis turns on
defining the nature of the offense to which
Lennon pled. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and, for the reasons that
follow, we will affirm.

different Trooper’s vehicle with her car.2
Lennon was sentenced to four years
imprisonment, but was paroled to INS
custody for deportation due to her criminal
activity.

I.

Lennon was deported to her native
Jamaica on September 24, 1993. Eleven
months after being deported, Lennon reentered the United States under the
pseudonym Diedra Barlow. She neither
applied for admission to the United States
nor obtained the express consent of the
Attorney General before she re-entered.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).

Lennon entered the United States in
1981 at the age of 17 as a lawful
permanent resident. She is a single mother
of three children, all American citizens by
birth. She has maintained a close
relationship with her children and has
provided for them despite receiving no
support from their three biological
fathers.1 She also suffers from Graves’
disease, an autoimmune disorder.

Soon after her illegal re-entry,
Lennon resumed her violations of the law.
She was convicted in 1996 of possession
with intent to distribute marijuana.3 That
offense resulted in a sentence of sixty days
imprisonment followed by three years
probation. Lennon also pled guilty to
shoplifting three times in 1998, receiving
a probation sentence each of the last two
times. Additional shoplifting charges

Lennon’s means of providing for
herself and her children have not always
been legal. In 1983, at age nineteen and
only two years after assuming legal
permanent residency in the United States,
Lennon committed a shoplifting offense.
She was convicted in 1988 and received a
$300 fine. That year, Lennon was also
charged with and convicted of violating
the Pennsylvania Controlled Substance
Act, when drugs and drug paraphernalia
were found in her apartment. She served
28 months of her 27 to 53 month sentence.
In 1992, she was convicted of aggravated
assault on a New Jersey State Trooper.
Lennon led the Troopers on a high-speed
chase that reached speeds over 100 miles
per hour and ended when she struck a

2

In the arrest leading to the present
charges, Lennon once again struck the
vehicle of her arresting officers. She was
apprehended by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) while in her
vehicle. Upon seeing the approaching
agents, Lennon shifted her car into reverse
and struck the INS vehicle that was parked
behind her and intended to block her
escape.

1

3

The father of Lennon’s second
child, Ashley Esplante, was murdered in
Philadelphia in 1993.

Lennon pled nolo contendere in
Los Angeles, California, Superior Court.
2

remain pending against her in Cherry Hill,
New Jersey; Upper Merion Township,
Pennsylvania; and Springfield Township,
Pennsylvania.4 Grand larceny and grand
theft charges remain pending against her
in, respectively, Orange County and Palm
Beach County, Florida.

apprehension in 2001. That being so, the
Government advocated including as
criminal history enhancements two of
Lennon's crimes that “occurred” for
criminal history purposes fewer than ten
years before her 1994 re-entry date but
more than ten years before the date in
2001 on which she was “found,” in the
sense of being actually apprehended.

Lennon eventually came to the
attention of INS officials as a result of an
anonymous tip and was apprehended on
July 7, 2001. She was indicted for, and
pled guilty to, being “found in the United
States, having knowingly and unlawfully
re-entered the United States” in violation
of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2)
(hereinafter “Section 1326"). J.A. at 32.
Section 1326(a) contains three separate
offenses, phrased in the disjunctive: (1)
illegal re-entry, (2) attempted illegal reentry, and (3) being found illegally in the
United States. See United States v.
DiSantillo, 615 F.2d 128, 134 (3d Cir.
1980).

Lennon also argued that, whatever
crime she was charged with, the 1993
Sentencing Guidelines should apply
because her crime was completed upon her
illegal re-entry in 1994. The Government
disagreed, pointing out that Section 1326
enumerates being “found in” as a criminal
offense that is distinct from unlawful reentry. The Government argued that
because her “found in” violation was
continuing, it was “committed” at the time
she re-entered through the date when she
came to the attention of INS officials in
2001. Under that theory, the 1993 version
of the Guidelines was inapplicable.

At sentencing, Lennon contended
that the indictment ambiguously charged
her both with illegal re-entry, and with
being illegally “found in” the United
States. The Government asserted that that
Lennon was charged only with the “found
in” charge of Section 1326(a) and
contended that such a violation is a
continuing one, starting on the date (or
approximate date) of her actual re-entry in
1994 and running through her

In the alternative, Lennon argued
that the District Court should use the
November 2000 version of the
Guidelines—those in effect on the date
she was apprehended by INS
officials—rather than the November 2001
version of the Guidelines—those in effect
on the date she was sentenced. The
Government contended that use of the
November 2001 Guidelines was
appropriate and gave rise to no Ex Post
Facto issue.

4

Lennon was also charged with
shoplifting in 1989 but the charges were
dismissed.

In imposing sentence, the District
Court first held that Lennon’s crime was
3

committed on the date she was
“found”—thus falling under the “found
in” prong of Section 1326. The District
Court looked to the November 2001
Guidelines, Section 2L1.2, to find
Lennon's base offense level to be 8. The
District Court then applied the 16 point
enhancement
in
Section
2L1.2(b)(1)(A)—based either on Lennon's
aggravated assault convictio n
(2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)) or her possession with
intent to dis tribute conv iction
(2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i)). Next, the District
Court reduced her offense level by three
points for acceptance of responsibility
under Section 3E1.1 for a total offense
level of 21.

57 months imprisonment. Lennon timely
appealed and maintains that the District
Court violated her rights under the
Constitution’s Ex Post Facto clause.
We exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s interpretation of the
Sentencing Guidelines and constitutional
questions. See United States v. Cicirello,
301 F.3d 135, 137 (3d Cir. 2002); United
States v. Spinello, 265 F.3d 150, 153 (3d
Cir. 2001); United States v. Figueroa, 105
F.3d 874, 875-76 (3d Cir. 1997). We
review the District Court’s factual
findings for clear error, see Cicirello, 301
F.3d at 137, and the District Court’s
application of those facts to the Guidelines
for an abuse of discretion. See Buford v.
United States, 532 U.S. 59, 62-66 (2001);
United States v. Zats, 298 F.3d 182, 185
(3d Cir. 2002). In this context, we
consider each of Lennon’s claims in turn.

Finally, the District Court looked to
Lennon's extensive criminal history in
order to assign her a criminal history
score. The District Court did consider
under Section 4A1.2(e) those of Lennon’s
offenses that occurred more than ten years
before her 2001 “found” date—implicitly
holding that “found in” violations are
continuing crimes—and assigned her four
criminal history points for those offenses.
The District Court assigned an additional
8 points under Section 4A1.2(e) for those
of Lennon’s crimes that occurred within
ten years before her “found” date. The
District Court designated a total criminal
history category of V. The District Court
determined, however, that this criminal
history was overstated, and reduced it to a
category IV, making her sentencing range
57-71 months. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3 (2001).
The District Court imposed a sentence of

II.
The Ex Post Facto clause provides:
“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed.” U.S. CONST . art. I, § 9,
cl. 3; see also U.S. CONST . art. I, § 10, cl.
1. A law does not run afoul of the Ex Post
Facto clause unless it retroactively “alters
the definition of criminal conduct or
increases the penalty by which a crime is
punishable.” Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v.
Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n.3 (1995);
see also, e.g., Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S.
433, 440-41 (1997) (citing Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. (Dall.) 386, 390 (1798)); United
States v. Brady, 88 F.3d 225, 227 (3d Cir.
1996) (citing Cummings v. Missouri, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 227, 326-26 (1866)). The
4

2001 Guidelines.5

Sentencing Guidelines—along with all
statutes that impose or dictate
sentence—are, of course, subject to the Ex
Post Facto clause. See Miller v. Florida,
482 U.S. 423, 429-35 (1987); United
States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 526 (3d Cir.
1991); see also U.S. SENTEN CING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.11 (2003).
But a District Court is entitled to employ
the Guidelines in place at the time of
sentencing unless doing so would expose
the defendant to harsher penalties than
were in effect at the time the crime was
committed. See United States v. Corrado,
53 F.3d 620, 622-23 (3d Cir. 1995). In
order to establish, therefore, that the Ex
Post Facto clause requires the application
of an earlier version of the Sentencing
Guidelines, a defendant must show that
the crime was committed at a time that the
earlier Guidelines version was in force and
that the earlier version is more favorable
to him or her. See United States v.
Audinot, 901 F.2d 1201, 1202 (3d Cir.
1990).

The key to this argument is
Lennon’s claim that the Section 1326
violation to which she pled guilty was
committed in 1994, when she illegally reentered the United States and when the
1993 Guidelines were in force. First,
Lennon asserts that the indictment is
5

Lennon argues that none of the
enhancements in the 1994 Guidelines
would have applied to her. She contends
that her New Jersey aggravated assault
conviction would not have met the
definition of “aggravated felony” under
the 1993 Guidelines because it was not “a
crime of violence . . . for which the term
of imprisonment imposed . . . is at least 5
years.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES §
2L1.2, cmt. n.7 (1993); 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(F) (1995). She concludes
that, because none of the other
enhancements would have applied to her,
her total offense level would have equaled
the base offense level of 8. Neither party
addressed whether Lennon’s 1988
Pennsylvania controlled substance
conviction would have qualified as an
aggravated felony under subsection
1101(a)(43)(B) as “illicit trafficking in a
controlled substance,” making the 1993
G u i d e l i n e s’ a g g r a v a te d f e l o ny
enhancement nonetheless applicable to
her. Because it does not change our
analysis, we assume that her 1988
Pennsylvania controlled substance
conviction would not have qualified as an
“aggravated felony” within the meaning of
the 1993 Guidelines.

A.
Lennon first contends that the
version of the Guidelines in force on the
date of her 1994 re-entry—the 1993
Guidelines—should have been used to
calculate her sentence. Those guidelines
would have been more favorable to her
because, she argues, she would have
faced—before a reduction for acceptance
of responsibility—a total offense level of
8, rather than the level 24 the District
Court calculated under the November

5

ambiguously worded to charge both the
“re-entry” prong and the “found in” prong
of Section 1326.6 She invokes the “rule of
lenity,” see United States v. Lainer, 520
U.S. 259, 266 (1997), and argues that the
crime with which she is charged should be
deemed to be illegal re-entry in 1994
because the 1993 Guidelines are more
lenient than the 2001 Guidelines under
which she was sentenced.

we need to discuss at some length.
In DiSantillo, the defendant had
been arrested and deported in 1962. Id. at
130. He re-entered the United States in
1970, under his own name and on an
immigrant visa issued by the American
Consul General in Italy. But because of
his earlier deportation, that visa was
improper and DiSantillo’s re-entry was in
violation of Section 1326. Id.

This is not a reasonable application
of the rule of lenity. Notwithstanding the
reference to Lennon’s “re-entry,” the
indictment clearly charges her under the
“found in” prong of Section 1326. See
United States v. Whittaker, 999 F.2d 38,
40-41 (2d Cir. 1993) (concluding that
alien’s crime occurred for sentencing
purposes on alien’s “found” date even
though the indictment charged all three
prongs of Section 1326).

DiSantillo was not interviewed by
INS agents until 1976 and not
indicted—under Section 1326's “found in”
prong—until 1979. Id. He argued that the
five-year statute of limitations for his
“found in” violation began to run on his
re-entry into the United States and expired
in 1975. Id. at 132. The Government
argued that DiSantillo’s offense was a
continuing one, “effectively tolling the
statute of limitations for as long as the
alien remain[ed] illegally in the country.”
Id. at 132.

Next, though somewhat obliquely,
Lennon argues that even if her violation
was being “found in” the United States
illegally, that offense occurred as a matter
of law at the time she illegally crossed into
the United States in 1994 through a
recognized port of entry. This argument is
on somewhat stronger footing, flowing
from this Court’s decision in United States
v. DiSantillo, 615 F.2d at 134-36,7 which

We looked to the plain language of
Section 1326 and held that the statute of
limitations for a “found in” violation
begins on the date the alien comes to the
attention of immigration authorities. Id. at

the statute of limitations has run on her
“found in” violation. See DiSantillo, 615
F.2d at 134-36.
But Lennon
unquestionably waived any argument she
may have had based on the statute of
limitations by failing to raise that defense
before the District Court. Accordingly,
we voice no opinion with respect to that
defense.

6

Lennon does not assert, however,
that the ambiguity in the indictment
renders it duplicitous.
7

We note that Lennon’s argument
could be construed as a means of
contending, by way of the back door, that
6

135. Central to our holding was the fact
that DiSantillo had passed through a
recognized port of entry pursuant to an
otherwise valid American-issued visa
under his own name. That being so, his
re-entry was not surreptitious, and
immigration authorities had sufficient
notice of that re-entry to start the running
of the five-year statute of limitations for
his “found in” offense. We contrasted, in
a dictum, DiSantillo’s case with the
example of an alien who enters the United
States surreptitiously. Id. at 134-36.
Under those circumstances, we reasoned,
Congress did not intend the statute of
limitations for “found in” violations to
begin running against the Government on
the date of the alien’s illegal re-entry into
the United States. Rather, as in the case of
DiSantillo’s non-surreptitious re-entry, the
statute of limitations only begins to run
once the Government is on notice of the
alien’s illegal presence in the United
States.

with “knowledge” of an alien’s presence
in the United States—does not extend to a
case such as this, where Lennon
affirmatively concealed her identity. To
hold otherwise would actually favor the
illegal entrants who affirmatively conceal
their identities over those who honestly
use their own names.8

8

The Government urges that the
crime of being “found in” the United
States is a continuing offense, just in the
same way that a conspiracy is. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jake, 281 F.3d 123, 129
n.6 (3d Cir. 2002). The argument has
force; the passage of time does not give
rise to a de facto amnesty that legalizes an
unlawful alien’s presence.
But the
question of whether “found in” violations
are continuing crimes was addressed, to a
limited extent, in our holding in
DiSantillo. 615 F.2d at 134-36. In the
context of that case, we held that the
“found in” prong did not codify a
continuing crime. Id. Since that time,
numerous other courts have taken
positions that are, to varying degrees, to
the contrary. See United States v. RuizGea, 340 F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir.
2003); United States v. Mendez-Cruz, 329
F.3d 885, 889 (D.C. Cir. 2003); United
States v. Lopez-Flores, 275 F.3d 661, 663
(7th Cir. 2001); United States v. MendezCasillas, 272 F.3d 1199, 1203-05 (9th Cir.
2001); United States v. Ruelas-Arreguin,
219 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Reyes-Nava, 169 F.3d
278, 279-80 (5th Cir. 1999)); United
States v. Diaz-Diaz, 135 F.3d 572, 575

In short, DiSantillo held that illegal
re-entry begins, for statute of limitations
purposes, when the alien presents himself
non-surreptitiously (i.e., using his own
name) at an open point of entry even
though immigration personnel failed to
react. That makes some sense because the
Government has sufficient notice of the
alien’s presence in the United States to
bear the burden of the running of the
statute of limitations against it. Id. Here,
however, Lennon admits that she used an
alias when she crossed into the United
States. The logic of DiSantillo—that
immigration authorities should be imputed
7

This reading of DiSantillo is
consistent with the decisions of other
courts, holding that the offense of being
“found in” the United States illegally is
“committed” when the alien comes to the
affirmative attention of INS officials. See
United States v. Rodriguez, 26 F.3d 4, 8
(1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Gonzales,
988 F.2d 16, 18 (5th Cir. 1993);
Whittaker, 999 F.2d at 40-42. Indeed, in
Whittaker, the Second Circuit interpreted
Section 1326 as we do here: Where an
alien unlawfully enters with a fictitious
name, even through a recognized port of
entry, he is “found in” the United States
when actually discovered. Whittaker, 999
F.2d at 42. Accordingly, Lennon’s Section
1326 violation was “committed” when she
was apprehended by INS officials in 2001.

any error by the District Court in this
respect was harmless.9 Lennon concedes
that, excluding her pre-1991 crimes, her
criminal history score was a Level IV.
The District Court here ultimately
sentenced her based on a criminal history
of Level IV, arriving at the same
sentencing range as would have resulted
had the District Court excluded Lennon’s
pre-1991 crimes.10 Thus, any error by the
9

The Government argues that there
is no error because Lennon’s offense was
a continuing one, lasting from 1994
through 2001.
This is arguably
inconsistent with DiSantillo, but we need
not reach the question.
10

At oral argument, Lennon’s
counsel suggested that the District Court’s
use of the older crimes might be error even
though the District Court applied the
lower criminal history level. Lennon’s
counsel speculated that the District Court
might have been inclined to reduce the
criminal history category irrespective of
whether that history reflected her pre-1991
crimes. All things being equal, the
argument runs, if the District Court had
not included her pre-1991 crimes but still
found her criminal history to be
overstated, her sentencing range—and
presumably her sentence—would have
been that much lower. Apart from being
pure speculation, Lennon’s counsel’s
argument was not advanced in her briefs.
For the same reason that we will not
consider an argument minted at the reply
brief stage, we will not consider an
argument made by counsel for the first

Finally, Lennon observes that a
logical implication of a finding that her
crime was “committed” in 2001 is that her
pre-1991 crimes should not have been
used as sentencing factors, since they
“occurred” for sentencing purposes before
the Guidelines’ ten year look-back period
as measured from her “found” date. But

(8th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Castrillon-Gonzales, 77 F.3d 403, 406
(11th Cir. 1996); see also United States v.
Almendarez, 1 Fed. Appx. 234, (4th Cir.
2001) (unpublished per curiam). But see
United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d
277, 280-82 (2d Cir. 1995). Perhaps this
should cause a re-examination of our
holding in DiSantillo. But we need not
confront the continued viability of
DiSantillo in this case.
8

District Court in initially considering
Lennon’s pre-1991 crimes for criminal
history purposes was harmless. See
United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203,
208 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that a
sentencing error need not be remanded if
“the record shows that the sentence was
unaffected by the error.”); United States v.
Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 229 (3d Cir. 1999).

Aggravated felonies that
trigger the adjustment from
subsection (b)(1)(A) vary
widely. If subsection
(b)(1)(A) applies, and (A)
the defendant has
previously been convicted
of only one felony offense;
(B) such offense was not a
crime of violence or
firearms offense; and (C)
the term of imprisonment
imposed for such offense
did not exceed one year, a
downward departure may be
warranted based on the
seriousness of the
aggravated felony.

B.
The only remaining question, then,
is whether the District Court should have
used the November 2000, rather than the
November 2001, version of the
Guidelines.
Lennon argues that the November
2000 version of the Guidelines was more
favorable to her because the November
2001 Guidelines eliminated the downward
departure provision under Section 2L1.1.
Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2L1.2 & cmt. 5 (November
2000) with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2L1.2 (November 2001).
Because the District Court used the
November 2001 Guidelines, she was
denied the opportunity for that additional
departure.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
2L1.2 cmt. 5 (November 2000). Lennon
arguably fails each of the Comment’s
three conditions. Contrary to condition
(A), she had been convicted of two
felonies—aggravated assault in New
Jersey and violation of the Pennsylvania
Controlled Substance Act. Contrary to
condition (B), her aggravated assault
offense probably qualified as an
“aggravated felony” as defined under the
November 2000 Guidelines. 11
And
contrary to condition (C), her New Jersey
aggravated assault conviction carried a
sentence of longer than one year.

As the Government points out,
Lennon’s criminal record would have
prevented her from being considered for a
downward departure under the November
2000 Guidelines. Section 2L1.2, comment
5 of the November 2000 Guidelines states:

11

See U.S. S EN TEN CIN G
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1
(November 2000).

time at oral argument. See Nagle v.
Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 1993) .
9

Since the downward departure
provision was inapplicable to her, the
November 2000 version of the Guidelines
was no more favorable to Lennon than
was the November 2001 version. That
being so, the Ex Post Facto clause did not
prevent her from being sentenced under
the November 2001 Guidelines—the
Guidelines in force at the time of her
sentencing—and the District Court did not
err by doing so.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will
affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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